It is imperative to examine the differences between active and latent errors in bus accidents. This research aims to study and assess human factors to determine the impact of behavior has in this domain. For this research we examine a set of 452 bus accident investigation reports. Nine evaluators were invited to assess human factors using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework. The inter-evaluator reliability is assessed using the Krippendorff's coefficient. Interdependencies between adjacent horizontal factors and the statistics for human factors were analyzed using odds ratios and lambda and chi-square methods. There are twenty-one significant associations between human factors and the adjacent levels of HFACS. Among them, organizational process and inadequate supervision, inadequate supervision and personal readiness, and personal readiness and violations appear to be the most significant. The four most significant HFACS factors are organizational process, personal readiness, inadequate supervision, and violations. These together form a route of failure. The active error of violations is closely related to the latent errors organizational process, inadequate supervision and personal readiness. Efforts to reduce the incidence of these three errors will significantly decrease the rate of bus-related accidents.
I. INTRODUCTION
Transportation by bus is typically regarded as a safe way for people to travel. However, when accidents occur there is a significant cost in terms of property loss and personal injury. In particular, for accidents that result in fatalities, events such as this are far from negligible [1] . Recently, in the interest of mitigating such loss, there has been a push towards enhancing bus safety in various parts of the world [2] . The majority of bus-related accidents are caused by both active and latent errors [3] . Moreover, it is well understood that latent errors can lead to active errors [4] , and therefore it is of great importance to explore the interdependencies between these types of errors.
In general, an active error that leads to an accident is related to the behavior of the driver. In contrast, latent errors are typically hidden from view, and are the indirect cause of The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jenny Mahoney.
accidents. This unforeseen threat is hazardous and constitutes a serious safety concern [5] . Research has shown that latent errors carry the potential to induce the preconditions for active errors [6] - [8] . This often occurs when they originate from the higher levels within the organization and relate to review structures and management [9] .
Past research in this area has been undertaken by many researchers and has focused on the factors that lead to accidents that involve buses and drivers [10] - [13] . Different from these findings, Hashim and Taha [3] made the claim that bus accidents are more often attributed to latent errors. Hashim's work turned attention to the physiological factors, including occupational information, stress in the workplace, and others. These factors have a detrimental effect on alertness, which is a consequence of physical fatigue. Together, these issues lead to accidents and near-miss accidents. In their research, Hashim and Taha [3] only considered the impact of latent errors with respect to bus accidents, ignoring the role played by active errors. Therefore, in order to better understand and mitigate the circumstances that lead to potentially serious accidents, it is important to identify the latent errors. Once identified, the interdependencies between errors must be explored [14] .
With respect to causality models that have been developed for accidents, many have been implemented and then later modified to meet the needs of specific environments. Examples include the skill rule knowledge framework [15] , the generic error modeling system [16] , the mixed logit model [17] and the aforementioned HFACS [18] , [19] . HFACS is based on the swiss cheese model of accident causation, and explores the roles played by both active and latent errors in accidents. Errors of the latent type include safety supervision and safety organization management [20] . HFACS is a thorough, far-reaching and reliable framework used to make determinations with respect to human error [21] - [24] .
The HFACS framework has a consistent hierarchy that is divided into four layers, as shown in Fig.1 [25] . The HFACS framework indicates a qualitative relationship between latent and active errors. However, it does not go as far as defining a quantitative relationship between the two. Several studies have considered the influence of the latent errors described in HFACS, and how they might affect active errors. Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping (FCM) [20] , Analytic Network Process (ANP) [26] and other statistical methods [8] , [14] , [27] can reveal the interdependence between human factors. However, these methods have some limitations. For example, the ANP consists of a lengthy questionnaire that is required for the assessment of interrelationships between factors. FCM is greatly influenced by the subjectivity and limitations of individual experts. Using a statistical hypothesis test, such as the chi-square test, is a reasonable way to avoid such shortcomings. In Daramola [28] , a chi-square (χ 2 ) analysis was used in the estimation of associative strength, specifically, the statistical significance of relationships between categories in the higher and lower levels of the hierarchy. In addition, the proportional reduction in error is calculated using the lambda measure for association (λ) [29] .
Before using statistical methods, experts are required to record accident details according to the HFACS framework. In order to ensure the validity and consistency of the description, it is necessary to perform the inter-evaluator reliability test on the information supplied by the experts. Using the joint probability of agreement as a measure is common; however, this method only works for two evaluators. Also, it fails to account for chance agreement between evaluators, which can be quite high in cases where the number of options, or categories, is small [30] . Cohen's kappa has a more stringent measure of reliability [31] , as it takes the amount of agreement expected by chance into account. Again, as with the previous measure, it applies only to a small number of evaluators. In cases where there are several evaluators, performing a pair-wise comparison between them is difficult. Moreover, it is almost impossible for the group to agree on a consistent result using the specified steps [8] . It is important to also consider that when evaluators are working together, the more evaluators there are, the more reliable the results will be. Krippendorff's alpha coefficient [32] is a powerful version of the Cohen kappa that is used to assess reliability. It is versatile in that it considers the reliability of both the inter-and intra-evaluators, it is flexible in the quantity of evaluators, and it accepts measurements with values that can be nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio data. It is also capable of handling data with missing instances, as well as small sample sizes.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the terminology and provides descriptions for concepts that are specific to this research. This includes the four levels within the error taxonomy, the frequency-based statistical analysis method, and a detailed description for inter-evaluator reliability. It also includes details with respect to how and why the analysis is performed. In Section 3, 452 reports were collected and disassembled, each concerning an accident investigation. Section 4 describes the outcome of assessments for inter-evaluator reliability, as well as details concerning the statistical analysis of the reports. Also discussed are the results of applying the HFACS framework; namely, the frequency of human factors, the norms, and the route of failure. Section 5 contains recommendations for the prevention of accidents. The limitations and research choices are also discussed. The final section discusses the conclusions.
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS
An overview of the method presented in this work is illustrated in Fig. 2 . In our analysis of the bus system, Krippendorff's alpha coefficient is used to assess the reliability of the inter-evaluators. Calculating the interdependence between human factors is performed using chi-square and lambda analysis.
A. HUMAN ERROR -FOUR LEVEL TAXONOMY
HFACS was originally created to be used for the aeronautics industry. With only slight alterations to the framework it is applicable to a range of applications, including different industries and tasks. We have made such changes to the levels of HFACS in order to best accommodate bus accidents, as detailed in Table 1 . This refinement presents a clear system for classifying errors and allows evaluators to specify contributing factors as part of the analysis. There is a fact that the experts have reached a consensus in identifying and classifying the causes of accidents, and the HFACS structure is highly compatible with bus accidents.
B. APPLYING A FREQUENCY-BASED APPROACH
The frequency-based approach is undertaken to perform a statistical analysis that provides a clear and straightforward overview of the accident report. The accuracy of the analysis is heavily correlated with the sample size; as the number of considered incidents increases, the results more accurately reflect the facts.
In the process of decomposition, it is very important to carefully link the causes of accidents to the corresponding human factors. In order to obtain more descriptive errors, a specification was defined to describe the causality of the accident. For example, some of the norms of inadequate supervision are: (1) Neglect of duty; (2) Failure to provide guidance on the maintenance of operating equipment; and (3) Failure to provide adequate training for safety. The human factors and the relevant norm(s) were noted and taken into consideration if they resulted in an accident. In addition, the frequency of human factors leading to an accident were also calculated.
C. INTER-EVALUATOR RELIABILITY
As part of our research we selected nine evaluators, shown in Table 2 , all of whom were from the Wuhan Traffic 
Management
Bureau. An evaluator is chosen with consideration of sufficient work experience and an appropriate academic background. Factors such as age and gender are not taken into account. The evaluators classified the cause of the bus accident according to the HFACS framework provided, but at the same time it is necessary to ensure that their results are both consistent and reliable. The use of the HFACS framework is simple and straightforward, however, it is a common complaint from evaluators that they are unable to classify every error with confidence using the taxonomy. In order to deal with this issue, a formal training plan is needed. Such a plan must be thorough and have sufficient detail that includes factors and examples. This will ultimately give the evaluators confidence in their use of the HFACS taxonomy.
Nine evaluators were first organized and tasked with the purpose of determining every possible error, both active and latent. They were given 15 accident reports, and the results were compiled in an accident causation list. When there was a divergence in results, discussions took place among all of the evaluators. There was a discussion specifically about the mistakes that everyone agreed caused the accident. Ultimately, the evaluators must reach a consensus on all of the results [33] . It is critical that each evaluator is proficient in classifying errors, which means that they must be trained until they can effectively use HFACS. Finally, the chosen evaluators needed to make independent conclusions on 452 reports for each of the factors identified in the initial round. An inter-evaluator reliability test on the evaluator's results was performed. If the inter-evaluator reliability results meet the reliability requirements, the final data of the code is subject to the principle of majority rule (according to the code of the nine evaluators); If the inter-evaluator reliability results do not meet the reliability requirements, then the evaluators need to reach a consensus on all the results. In this study, since there were nine evaluators, the Krippendorff's alpha coefficient was used. This measures the inter-evaluator reliability, and tests for consistency in the results.
D. ANALYSIS OVERVIEW
The process of analysis takes place over several steps. First, a chi-square (χ 2 ) is used to test the human factor pairs for homogeneity [34] . Second, the lambda (λ) analysis (Goodman, Kruskal 1954) is performed in search of significant connections between adjacent factors. The null hypothesis, H0, indicates the assumption that the HFACS risk factors for the bus system are mutually independent, while the alternative hypothesis, H1, indicates the opposite, where at least pair of factors are dependent, or interrelated. The chi-square statistic is calculated using the chi-square distribution with the appropriate degree of freedom for H1, and the level of significance is set at α = 0.05. Thus, we have χ 2 α = 3.842 [35] . If the calculated value of χ 2 is greater than the critical value of χ 2 α , the null hypothesis is rejected and H1 is accepted. This implies that there is a dependency between the factors. Next, the related factors were used to apply the Lambda measurement method to the correlation analysis. The degree of mutual influence was then calculated and used to determine the mutual influence of human factors. Finally, the presence of lower level factors is estimated using the odds ratios. This is significant because they are associated with the presence of higher-level factors.
III. DATA COLLECTION AND DECOMPOSITION A. DATA COLLECTION
The quality and reliability of bus accident reports is helpful for improving the bus safety management system. Moreover, it is useful in providing advice for accident prevention. Four hundred and fifty-two bus accident reports were collected from several websites including the Ministry of Management of the People's Republic of China, and websites belonging to the provincial safety production supervision bureaus in several provinces. These accident cases cover the years between 2005 and 2017. Each report provides detailed information about the accident, including the vehicle and people involved. Further, the reports describe the outcome of the accident, the cause analysis, a determination of responsibility and the treatment and prevention recommendations. The accident investigation report is based on the guiding scientific principle of seeking truth through facts. An accident report investigation team is composed of the government, the safety production supervision and management department, the transportation department, the public security department and other relevant departments. These reports can be asserted to be reliable and of high quality, and thus are suitable for decomposition.
B. CODING AND DECOMPOSITION
There are several components that make up an accident investigation report. A description of the unit accompanies details of the events, the nature of the accident and how it was handled. It also describes both active and latent errors. Reports are encoded after collection. The code is made up of the accident location and the date that it occurred. It is after this point than the evaluators meet to discuss all of the factors.
To illustrate the process of decomposition, the accident investigation report coded ''Liling city liling avenue-20160923'' is used as an example. Table 3 contains the basic information concerning this accident. As previously described, Table 4 indicates the human factors that led to the accident. A ''1'' represents a contributing factor, while a ''0'' indicates a non-contributing factor. Taking the 'Organizational climate' human factor as an example, the recorded data is coded as ''1'' because one of its norms, AC12, is listed as a cause. For each of the reports that were in the sample, the evaluators undertook the same process, beginning with the analysis and continuing to the decomposition. Afterwards, the nine experts engaged in discussion and debate to resolve any conflicts. The last stage involved calculating the statistics that were used to find correlations between specific human factors. This required that the human factors and their respective norms be counted and categorized appropriately.
IV. RESULTS

A. INTER-EVALUATOR RELIABILITY AND FREQUENCIES
After the evaluators worked independently, but before they collaborated to resolve conflicts, the inter-evaluator reliability at the categorical level should be calculated as a consistency check. Krippendorff's alpha values from 0.8 to 1.0 are considered reliable, and between 0.667 and 0.8 they are tentatively reliable [32] . The inter-evaluator reliability, based on the data that is generated during the first round, is shown in Table 5 . The results show that interevaluator reliability is above the threshold of 66.7%, meaning that it is acceptable. The actual values for consistency between the nine rates are in the range of 68%-87%. Table 5 also shows the frequency statistics of human factors in the HFACS framework. These are derived after the conflict resolution stage during round two. The six human factors with the highest frequency counts were D4 -Violations, C4 -Personal readiness, B2 -Inadequate supervision, C3 -Condition of the operator, C2 -Physical environment, and A2 -Organizational process. Preliminary results indicate 290 Level 1 incidents of Violations, which is 64.16% of the 452 total accidents. At Level 2 there were 269 incidents of Personal readiness', which is 59.51%. Level 3 had 249 Inadequate supervision incidents, 55.09% of the total and Level 4 contained 233 incidents of organizational process, or 51.55% of the total. These statistics were unanimously reported by the evaluators during round two. Each evaluator was familiar with the bus accident Survey Report.
The decomposition process reports the norms of four factors with the highest frequencies. The statistics for each factor vary; for example, one of the factors may have many norms, while others have less. Norms with low frequency may play a less important role. Tables 6-9 contain the following main norms, accompanied by their frequencies: D4 -Violations, C4 -Personal readiness, B2 -Inadequate supervision, and A2 -organizational process. The attentive reader will see that the reported percentages do not total 100%. This disparity has to do with the number of causal factors that are listed in the report. When there is more than one associated with an accident then this number will increase.
B. CORRELATION ANALYSIS
The ranking of human factors relates to importance, as found by investigating the 452 bus accidents, where factors of greater importance are at the top of the list. This order, directs the investigator to those factors that are in the greatest need of attention. However, it does not describe the relationship that may exist between factors at different levels within the taxonomy. This can be found by using the correlation analysis. This task relies on our three statistical methods: the chisquare, the lambda measure, and the odds-ratio parameters. In advance of calculating the strength of associations between factors, it is assumed that all of the factors are related within adjacent HFACS levels. As such, the analysis begins with 52 relationships for each accident. The first condition relates to chi-square, where significant correlations are identified by a value greater than 3.84. The next condition relates to the lambda, whose values are divided into three sets: 0 indicates little or no relationship, the range (0, 0.5] indicates that the correlation is significant, and the range (0.5, 1] indicates a very significant association.
The analysis shows that there are twenty-one associations that pass the chi-square test. Nine of these have a lambda of zero, indicating that there is no relationship. Nine of the remaining relationships have a lambda in the second set, suggesting that there is indeed a relationship of some significance. Finally, the last three are in the third set, indicating a strong association. Fig. 3 illustrates these associations, and the results are expanded in Table 10 .
V. DISCUSSION
A. ROUTES BETWEEN CATEGORIES
As can be seen in Fig. 3 , there are eight relationships between the third (unsafe supervisions) and fourth (organizational influences) levels of the hierarchy. The first entry in the fourth level, Organizational climate, indicates two weak links to level three in 'inadequate supervision' and 'failed to correct known problems'. The second entry, 'organizational process' is considerably more connected in terms of relationships with the third level. The results indicate that there is a very strong relationship with 'inadequate supervision', and lesser but still significant relationships with 'planned inappropriate operations' and 'supervision violations', and that it is loosely associated with 'failed to correct known problems. The final two links are in 'Resource management'. The first indicates a weak association with 'inadequate supervision', and a more significant association with 'supervision violations'.
At the third level (unsafe supervisions) of the hierarchy we can see that there are only five associations with level two (pre-conditions for unsafe acts). Specifically, 'Planned inappropriate operations' is loosely connected to 'personal readiness' while 'Inadequate supervision' is significantly associated with 'Condition of the operator', and has a strong association with 'personal readiness'. Also, 'supervision violations' is weakly associated with 'personal readiness' and 'crew resource management'. The 'physical environment' is considered its own class. In the context of bus accidents, this is primarily based on inclement weather and road conditions. The authors do not believe that this can be meaningfully related to 'unsafe supervision'. As such, they did not consider whether this factor was interconnected with those on the third level.
The final analysis is between the factors on the second level, 'preconditions for unsafe acts', and the first, 'unsafe acts of operators. Figure 3 depicts eight different links, as follows: (1) 'technological environment' is loosely connected to 'skill-based errors'; (2) 'Physical environment' has a significant association with 'skill-based errors'; (3) the 'condition of the operator' shows significant associations with three different 'unsafe acts': 'skill-based errors', 'decision errors' and 'violations'. The final three relationships link to 'personal readiness'' which is strongly associated with 'violations', significantly associated with 'skill-based errors', and weakly associated with 'perception error'.
Our analysis indicates that the four most significant human factors are the 'organizational process' (A2), 'inadequate supervision' (B2), 'personal readiness' (C4) and 'violations' (D4). It is clear that there are various paths that result in failure as the traversal is made from the fourth to first level. This fact strongly suggests the interdependences between human factors. In particular, consider not only that all four of the factors exist within a single route (i.e. A2→B2→C4→D4), but also that each of these associations is strongly significant. It is telling that when considering the frequency of these top factors, those represented by B2, C4, and D4 are among the top three, while A2 is ranked sixth.
B. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
Referring to Table 6 , it can be seen that that the most important norm for 'violations' is excessive speed. This is followed by violations of other traffic rules. Excessive speed has always been one of the most important factors leading to road traffic accidents in China, and it should be paid great attention. In an effort to proactively tackle this problem, the authors believe that the company in charge of the bus service must arrange for additional supervision. In particular, the supervisor must routinely perform safety monitoring on the real-time speed of the bus. When it is observed that the driver is exceeding the speed limit, there must be an immediate intervention to halt this behavior. Video surveillance personnel are in position to handle this task. Afterwards, the driver should be mandated to enroll in an appropriate safety education program. This study found that the most important reason for excessive speed, as well as for other violations, is that the drivers have poor safety awareness. Companies that operate such businesses should regularly conduct safety education courses for bus drivers, and furthermore, should impose serious penalties for violations of conduct that negatively impacts these factors.
As can be seen from Table 10 , poor safety awareness is the most important norm in the 'personal readiness' category. In response, there are several recommendations for improving the safety awareness of employees. The primary goal must be to strengthen safety skills, which can be accomplished through training, education and adequate supervision. It is worth stating that an effective way to improve one's awareness in terms of safety is by ensuring that they are fully knowledgeable. Indeed, it is difficult to exercise safety in the face of ignorance. Being conscious with respect to safety issues, in combination with the proper teaching, will lead to proper judgments. In addition, the notion of a culture of safety is an important one in the challenge to improve bus safety. There is a need to establish a stable, sustainable safety training culture. Finally, safety education and training must be completed with both quality and quantity. As can be seen from Fig. 3 poor safety awareness is closely related to poor supervision.
It is clear from looking at Table 8 that the most important norm for 'inadequate supervision' is insufficient education and training. This is followed by neglect of duty. It seems obvious that a more comprehensive solution must be found in order to deal with this problem. One suggestion for this is to implement an integrated, interactive training system that consists of real-time tracking and data visualization technologies. It can be configured such that live feedback is provided for both trainer and trainee, which would allow them to address issues with performance while in training. With respect to negligence on the part of employees, improving hiring standards and further strengthening supervision will go a long way towards solving the problem. Table 9 shows that the most important norm for 'organizational processes' is the incomplete implementation of responsibilities, followed by incomplete safety regulations. It is clear that the senior leadership of the company is not sufficiently relevant to the security of the company, so the target audience for regular safety education and training should also include senior leaders. Enterprises should fully implement the responsibilities that each leader should perform. Moreover, they must improve the company's safety regulations and fully implement them.
C. LIMITATIONS
This study is limited by the fact that it relies heavily on the quality of the accident reports [36] . We understand that the reports that have been prepared are indeed of high quality; however, the data we obtained is primarily about the direct cause of the accident. The indirect reasons for the accident, as well as the internal aspects of the company, are often not clear. Without all of the information required to determine the human factors, it unfortunately affects the evaluators' ability to reach error-free conclusions. It is in this context that we recommend the government adopt a new strategy. In serious accidents there should be a group of specialists assigned to investigate and identify errors. While all errors are serious, a focus should be placed on the latent errors that are responsible for serious accidents. These findings should be included with the accident investigation report.
A second limitation in this work is concerns the ranking. The factors and their respective norms are ordered according to frequency, and this does not directly convey the interdependencies. In order to compensate for this, a more extensive analysis and evaluation should be undertaken. One way to consider relationships between factors and present the appropriate ranking would be to use the Analytic network process (ANP). It is a robust method, although as aforementioned, the questionnaire is often extensive when evaluating all of the interrelationships amongst factors. A second problem is that of expert bias; which causes errors, and makes it harder to reach a consensus when the number of experts is large [37] . Finally, this study fails to consider how valuable insights for the organization might be discovered through the use of single or multi-factor sensitivity analyses of the model [38] .
VI. CONCLUSION
This work involves the determination of relationships between both active and latent errors in bus accidents. The results are ranked by importance with respect to the human factors and their corresponding norms. Accident reports from 452 bus accidents between 2005 and 2017 were examined, and the human factors were extracted. The original reports were created using the HFACS framework. The factors and their corresponding norms were ranked according to their frequency. The interdependences between adjacent levels of the hierarchy were determined using the chi-square, lambda and odds ratio methods. The study serves as a helpful introduction to the problem of bus accidents and reveals significant interdependences amongst the human factors. Understanding these interdependencies is important because it to leads to suggestions that will prevent or reduce the rate of bus accidents.
In this research, the correlation between factors has been calculated and traced through until failure. The results are enriching in terms of recognizing and dealing with human. The four most important factors in bus accidents are the organizational process, inadequate supervision, personal readiness and violations. Together, these form a route to failure.
One of the goals of this study was to identify and label routes to failure, and to do so in a way that is easy to understand. An overly complicated structure was not necessary because only links between factors in adjacent levels of the HFACS hierarchy were considered.
